A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

Citations

Cited by:

1. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
2. Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Other publications TiSEM ff3a441f-e196-4e45-ba59-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Suetens, Sigrid & Ghidoni, Riccardo, 2019. "Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games," CEPR Discussion Papers 13809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Discussion Paper 2019-016, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
3. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
   • Cesi Berardino, 2009. "Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts," THEMA Working Papers 2009-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
4. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2017. "When And How The Punishment Must Fit The Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 315-330, May.
   • George J.Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2015. "When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
   • George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2015. "When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2015-622, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
   • Mailath, George J. & Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy, 2015. "When and how the punishment must fit the crime," Working Papers 15-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
   • George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2015. "When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime," CESifo Working Paper Series 5225, CESifo.
5. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2009. "The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
6. Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan, 2015. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 351-389, July.
   • Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2014. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-146/II, Tinbergen Institute.
7. Stefan Buehler & Dennis L. Gärtner, 2013. "Making Sense of Nonbinding Retail-Price Recommendations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 335-359, February.
   • Gärtner, Dennis L & Buehler, Stefan, 2009. "Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price Recommendations," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt51z312zt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
   • Stefan Bühler & Dennis L. Gärtner, 2009. "Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price Recommendations," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2009 2009-02, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
   • Stefan Buehler & Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price Recommendations," CESifo Working Paper Series 3024, CESifo.
   • Stefan Buehler & Dennis L. Gaertner, 2009. "Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price Recommendations," SOI - Working Papers 0902, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
8. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
   • Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   • Harold Houba & Erik Ansink, 2013. "Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-182/II, Tinbergen Institute.
9. Quan Wen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
10. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Ansink, Erik, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation," Sustainable Development Papers 54292, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
11. Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall, 2015. "On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-9, August.
12. , & , & , & ,, 2014. "Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
13. Berardino Cesi & Adriano Di Natale, 2019. "Transparency in repeated procurement: when hiding is better," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 14-23.
14. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2015. "Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1989, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
15. Timothy N Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Coordinating Collective Resistance Through Communication And Repeated Interaction," Monash Economics Working Papers 16/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
16. Riccardo Ghidoni & Sigrid Suetens, 2022. "The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 58-77, November.
17. Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
18. Raphael Thomadsen & Pradeep Bhardwaj, 2011. "Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(2), pages 363-375, February.
19. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2008. "Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-120/1, Tinbergen Institute.
20. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
21. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    • Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2016. "Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 11447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
22. Drouvelis, Michalis & Pearce, Graeme, 2023. "Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
23. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
24. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
25. MAHENC Philippe, 2007. "Cooperation among Overlapping Generations for a Public Project," LERNA Working Papers 07.08.229, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
26. Ramakanta Patra & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2021. "Full Collusion with Entry and Incomplete Information," KIER Working Papers 1055, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
27. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.