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Testing the Theory of Multitasking: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment in Chinese Factories

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Cited by:

  1. Marta De Philippis, 2021. "Multi-Task Agents and Incentives: The Case of Teaching and Research for University Professors," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1643-1681.
  2. Brian S. Silverman & Paul Ingram, 2017. "Asset ownership and incentives in early shareholder capitalism: Liverpool shipping in the eighteenth century We are deeply indebted to historians Nick Radburn and especially Stephen Behrendt for exten," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 854-875, April.
  3. Jensen, Nathan & Lyons, Elizabeth & Chebelyon, Eddy & Bras, Ronan Le & Gomes, Carla, 2020. "Conspicuous monitoring and remote work," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 489-511.
  4. Omar Al-Ubaydli & John A. List, 2019. "How natural field experiments have enhanced our understanding of unemployment," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 3(1), pages 33-39, January.
  5. Manthei, Kathrin & Sliwka, Dirk, 2018. "Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank," IZA Discussion Papers 11581, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  6. Petra Nieken, 2022. "Digital leadership: Motivating online workers," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 498-498, September.
  7. Katharina Laske & Marina Schroeder, 2016. "Quantity, Quality, and Originality: The Effects of Incentives on Creativity," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 07-01, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
  8. Ro’i Zultan & Eldar Dadon, 2023. "Missing the forest for the trees: when monitoring quantitative measures distorts task prioritization," Working Papers 2319, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  9. Omar Al-Ubaydli & John A. List & Dana Suskind, 2019. "The Science of Using Science: Towards an Understanding of the Threats to Scaling Experiments," NBER Working Papers 25848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Englmaier, Florian & Roider, Andreas & Sunde, Uwe, 2014. "The Role of Communication of Performance Schemes," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 507, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  11. Gürtler, Oliver & Struth, Lennart & Thon, Max, 2023. "Competition and risk-taking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  12. Butschek, Sebastian & González Amor, Roberto & Kampkötter, Patrick & Sliwka, Dirk, 2022. "Motivating gig workers – evidence from a field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  13. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  14. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  15. Steven Jacob Bosworth & Simon Bartke, 2019. "Cross-task spillovers in workplace teams: Motivation vs. learning," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2019-15, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
  16. Bulte, Erwin & List, John A. & van Soest, Daan, 2021. "Incentive spillovers in the workplace: Evidence from two field experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 137-149.
  17. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2022. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4602-4630, June.
  18. Daniel Jones & Mirco Tonin & Michael Vlassopoulos, 2018. "Paying for what kind of Performance? Performance Pay and Multitasking in Mission-Oriented Jobs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7156, CESifo.
  19. Dirk Sliwka, 2020. "Bonuses and performance evaluations," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 478-478, July.
  20. Nuno-Ledesma, Jose G., 2020. "Incentive Alignment and Reward Strength in Pay-for-Performance Contracts," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304302, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  21. Ann P. Bartel, 2017. "Multitasking at work: Do firms get what they pay for?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 362-362, May.
  22. Michael Dinerstein & Isaac M. Opper, 2022. "Screening with Multitasking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9869, CESifo.
  23. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2019. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives and Plan Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2199R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2021.
  24. Florian Englmaier & Andreas Roider & Uwe Sunde, 2017. "The Role of Communication of Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4061-4080, December.
  25. List, John A. & Momeni, Fatemeh, 2020. "Leveraging upfront payments to curb employee misbehavior: Evidence from a natural field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
  26. Henry Eyring, 2020. "Disclosing Physician Ratings: Performance Effects and the Difficulty of Altering Ratings Consensus," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 1023-1067, September.
  27. Kathrin Manthei & Dirk Sliwka, 2019. "Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5861-5883, December.
  28. Sebastian Fest & Ola Kvaløy & Petra Nieken & Anja Schöttner, 2019. "Motivation and incentives in an online labor market," CESifo Working Paper Series 7526, CESifo.
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