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Citations for "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks"

by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen

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  1. Tood Keister, 2005. "Expectations and Contagion in Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Working Papers 0501, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  2. Cavallo, Eduardo A. & Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2008. "Does openness to trade make countries more vulnerable to sudden stops, or less? Using gravity to establish causality," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1430-1452, December.
  3. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2012. "Influential Opinion Leaders," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp458, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  4. Junichi Fujimoto, 2012. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Targets," 2012 Meeting Papers 501, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. József Sákovics & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3439-61, December.
  6. Mathevet, Laurent & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Tractable dynamic global games and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2583-2619.
  7. Laurent Mathevet & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp459, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  8. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc, 2011. "Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 14-24, September.
  9. Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves, 2015. "Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents," Textos para discussão 380, Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  10. Tamgac, Unay, 2011. "Crisis and self-fulfilling expectations: The Turkish experience in 1994 and 2000-2001," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 44-58, January.
  11. Geir H. Bjønnes & Steinar Holden & Dagfinn Rime & Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, 2009. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," CESifo Working Paper Series 2518, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000790, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Extremism in revolutionary movements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 97-121.
  14. Campos, Rodolfo G., 2013. "Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1624-1658.
  15. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1570, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Iachan, Felipe S. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2015. "Information quality and crises in regime-change games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 739-768.
  18. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
  19. Nikola Tarashev & Anna Zabai, 2016. "When pegging ties your hands," BIS Working Papers 547, Bank for International Settlements.
  20. Tijmen R. Daniels & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2008. "Defending against Speculative Attacks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-090/2, Tinbergen Institute, revised 06 Apr 2009.
  21. Tijmen Daniëls, 2009. "Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 417-439, December.
  22. Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Intertemporal coordination with delay options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 793-810.
  23. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets," CEIS Research Paper 245, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Jul 2012.
  25. Dasgupta, Amil, 2007. "Coordination and delay in global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 195-225, May.
  26. Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann & Tijmen R. Daniëls, 2013. "Crossing Network versus Dealer Market: Unique Equilibrium in the Allocation of Order Flow," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  27. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
  28. Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2013. "Contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 386-400.
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