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Executive rank, pay and project selection

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Malcomson James M, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
  2. Hilmer, Michael, 2014. "Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100552, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Baik, Bok & Evans, John H. & Kim, Kyonghee & Yanadori, Yoshio, 2016. "White collar incentives," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 34-49.
  4. Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, 2009. "Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 179-212, April.
  5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 99-133, April.
  6. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Hovakimian, Gayane & Sharma, Zenu, 2023. "Gender pay gap in American CFOs: Theory and evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
  7. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
  8. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Too Many to Fail - How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-18, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  9. Kuang, Y., 2007. "Incentive effects of performance-vested stock options," Other publications TiSEM 18dd1758-4773-426f-98f3-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  10. Barron, John M. & Chulkov, Dmitriy V. & Waddell, Glen R., 2011. "Top management team turnover, CEO succession type, and strategic change," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(8), pages 904-910, August.
  11. Manika Kohli, 2018. "Impact of Ownership Type and Board Characteristics on the Pay–Performance Relationship: Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, June.
  12. Xing, Xuejing & Yan, Shan, 2023. "Does organization capital increase firm risk? Evidence from firms with human resource executives☆," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
  13. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
  14. Lam, Kevin C.K. & McGuinness, Paul B. & Vieito, João Paulo, 2013. "CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese‐listed enterprises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1136-1159.
  15. João Vieito & Walayet Khan, 2012. "Executive compensation and gender: S&P 1500 listed firms," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 36(2), pages 371-399, April.
  16. Neslihan Ozkan & Oleksandr Talavera & Anna Zalewska, 2010. "Corporate Culture and the Tournament Hypothesis," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 017, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  17. McSweeney, Brendan, 2009. "The roles of financial asset market failure denial and the economic crisis: Reflections on accounting and financial theories and practices," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(6-7), pages 835-848, August.
  18. Khan, Walayet A. & Vieito, João Paulo, 2013. "Ceo gender and firm performance," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 55-66.
  19. Yin-Hua Yeh & Zih-Heng Lai, 2014. "The Causes and Risk-Taking on the Change of CEO Equity-Based Compensation Structure," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 4(2), pages 30-48, December.
  20. Peiyi Yu & Bac Luu, 2016. "Bank performance and executive pay: tournament or teamwork," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 607-643, October.
  21. Timothy Fogarty & Michel Magnan & Garen Markarian & Serge Bohdjalian, 2009. "Inside Agency: The Rise and Fall of Nortel," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(2), pages 165-187, January.
  22. Kin Lee & Baruch Lev & Gillian Yeo, 2008. "Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 315-338, April.
  23. Brown, Paul J & Matolcsy, Zoltan & Wells, Peter, 2014. "Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 100-114.
  24. Vo, Thi Thanh Nha & Canil, Jean Milva, 2019. "CEO pay disparity: Efficient contracting or managerial power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 168-190.
  25. Barron, John M. & Waddell, Glen R., 2008. "Work hard, not smart: Stock options in executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 767-790, June.
  26. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
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