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Citations for "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction"

by Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H.

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  1. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
  2. repec:fth:calaec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. repec:cdl:ucsbec:6-98 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Agostino Manduchi, 1998. "Similar Actions and Cooperation in the Centipede Played by Automata," Working Papers 98-06-053, Santa Fe Institute.
  5. Hart, Sergiu, 2002. "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November.
  6. Zibo Xu, 2013. "The instability of backward induction in evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp633, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Kristian Lindgren & Vilhelm Verendel, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
  8. Christian Hilbe & Moshe Hoffman & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-15, September.
  9. Lindgren, Kristian & Verendel, Vilhelm, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma--The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," MPRA Paper 43662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
  11. Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2005. "Learning to like what you have - explaining the endowment effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 689-702, 07.
  12. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
  13. Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997. "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive 598, David K. Levine.
  14. Zibo Xu, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in general extensive-form games of perfect information," Discussion Paper Series dp631, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  15. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 187-214, June.
  16. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
  17. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, 06.
  18. Kuzmics, Christoph, 2004. "Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 321-336, August.
  19. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July.
  20. Cressman, R., 2000. "Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 183-205, August.
  21. Xu, Zibo, 2013. "Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 745, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Jun 2013.
  22. repec:cdl:ucsbec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
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