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Citations for "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices"

by Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya

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  1. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  2. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CARF F-Series CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  4. Liad Blumrosen & Noam Nisan, 2005. "On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries," Discussion Paper Series dp381, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Madarász, Kristóf & Prat, Andrea, 2010. "Screening with an Approximate Type Space," CEPR Discussion Papers 7900, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2009. "Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 326-347, May.
  7. Liad Blumrosen & Noam Nisan, 2005. "On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions II: Ascending Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp382, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  8. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Introduction to computer science and economic theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
  9. Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012. "Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.
  10. Blumrosen, Liad & Nisan, Noam, 2010. "Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1203-1223, May.
  11. Timothy Van Zandt, 2008. "The Interplay Between Incentives and Communication Complexity in Mechanism Design," 2008 Meeting Papers 480, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Goossens D.R. & Müller R. & Spieksma F.C.R., 2007. "Matrix bids in combinatorial auctions: expressiveness and micro-economic properties," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  13. Dobzinski, Shahar & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 14-44.
  14. Beardon, Alan F. & Rowat, Colin, 2013. "Efficient sets are small," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 367-374.
  15. Ryuji Sano, 2016. "Iterative Revelation Mechanisms," KIER Working Papers 937, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  16. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
  17. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  18. Shahar Dobzinski & Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira, 2005. "Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp408, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  19. Fadaei, Salman & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(2), pages 767-777.
  20. Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 95-113, August.
  21. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  22. Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
  23. Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Schapira, Michael, 2013. "The communication burden of payment determination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 153-167.
  24. Yiqing Xing & Anqi Li, 2014. "Simple Labor Income Tax Systems with Endogenous Employment Contracts," 2014 Meeting Papers 866, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  25. John H. Kagel & Yuanchuan Lien & Paul Milgrom, 2010. "Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 160-185, August.
  26. Fadel, Ronald & Segal, Ilya, 2009. "The communication cost of selfishness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1895-1920, September.
  27. Mu'alem, Ahuva & Nisan, Noam, 2008. "Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 612-631, November.
  28. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  29. Eiichiro Kazumori, 2010. "Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experimental Study," CARF F-Series CARF-F-226, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  30. Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
  31. Perennes, Patricia, 2014. "Use of combinatorial auctions in the railway industry: Can the “invisible hand” draw the railway timetable?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 175-187.
  32. Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
  33. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.