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Citations for "Paths to stability for matching markets with couples"

by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip

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  1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2009. "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets," Working Papers 385, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2010. "Decentralized Market Processes to Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries," KIER Working Papers 749, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Utku Unver & Hideo Konishi, 2005. "Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems," 2005 Meeting Papers 208, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  5. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:67:p:1-12 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 616.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Mar 2006.
  8. Bary S.R. Pradelski, 2014. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game," Economics Series Working Papers 700, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Peter Biro & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1139, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  10. Bettina Klaus & Frédéric Payot, 2013. "Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  11. Klaus, Bettina & Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems," Working Papers 2014-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  12. Vilmos Komornik & Christelle Viauroux, 2012. "Conditional Stable Matchings," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 12-03, UMBC Department of Economics.
  13. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski, 2016. "Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(2), pages 1-10, March.
  14. repec:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:10:d:66888 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Chen, Bo & Fujishige, Satoru & Yang, Zaifu, 2016. "Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 25-36.
  16. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, 2008. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-017, Harvard Business School.
  17. Yang, Yi-You, 2012. "On the accessibility of core-extensions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 687-698.
  18. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2008. "Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 473-488, March.
  19. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  20. Heinrich Nax & Bary Pradelski, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 903-932, November.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.