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Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

Cited by:

  1. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  2. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  3. Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 301-309.
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
  5. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  6. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  7. Makoto Shimoji, 2017. "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 231-252, December.
  8. Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 00-13, Tel Aviv.
  9. repec:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0009 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  11. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000795 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Working Papers 055-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  13. Olga Gorelkina, 2015. "The Expected Externality Mechanism in a Level-k Environment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  14. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. repec:eee:econom:v:200:y:2017:i:2:p:326-343 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Azrieli Yaron & Levin Dan, 2012. "Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, May.
  17. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  18. Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 186-204.
  19. de Castro, Luciano I. & Riascos, Alvaro, 2009. "Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 559-575, September.
  20. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017. "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  21. Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
  22. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
  23. Jack Robles & Makoto Shimoji, "undated". "On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 09/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
  24. Doron Sonsino & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, 2006. "Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(4), pages 323-341, December.
  25. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
  26. Harry J. Paarsch & Jacques Robert, 2003. "Testing Equilibrium Behaviour At First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions With Discrete Bid Increments," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-32, CIRANO.
  27. Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 45-70, November.
  28. Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2003. "Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 175-188, May.
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