Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval
We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8) Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/10683/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2005.
"Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 155-170, April.
- Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 1997.
"Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
592, David K. Levine.
- Nick Feltovich & John Duffy, 1999. "Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 131-152.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992.
"Case-Based Decision Theory,"
994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Braunstein, Yale M & Schotter, Andrew, 1982. "Labor Market Search: An Experimental Study," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(1), pages 133-144, January.
- John List & David Reiley, 2008.
Artefactual Field Experiments
00091, The Field Experiments Website.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Sonsino, Doron, 2004. "Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 561-583, August.
- Schotter, A. & Merlo, A., 2000.
"Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning,"
00-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Merlo, Antonio & Schotter, Andrew, 2003. "Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 116-136, January.
- Merlo, A. & Schotter, A., 2001. "Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning," Working Papers 01-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- David Lucking-Reiley & John A. List, 2000.
"Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September.
- John List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00520, The Field Experiments Website.
- Heckman, James J, 1978.
"Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System,"
Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 931-959, July.
- James J. Heckman, 1977. "Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System," NBER Working Papers 0177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-1391, December.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June.
- Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-454, March.
- Schotter, Andrew & Braunstein, Yale M, 1981. "Economic Search: An Experimental Study," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. "Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
- Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:4:p:323-341. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.