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Do constitutions cause large governments? Quasi-experimental evidence

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Cited by:

  1. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, D.L.Daniel L., 2004. "Comparative politics and environmental taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 705-722, July.
  2. Zohal Hessami & Silke Uebelmesser, 2016. "A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 71-100, February.
  3. Jac C. Heckelman & Stephen Knack, 2008. "Foreign Aid and Market‐Liberalizing Reform," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 524-548, August.
  4. Parker Hevron, 2018. "Judicialization and Its Effects: Experiments as a Way Forward," Laws, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-21, May.
  5. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2007. "Why Are There Serial Defaulters? Evidence from Constitutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(4), pages 713-730.
  6. Borge, Lars-Erik & Rattsø, Jørn, 2008. "Property taxation as incentive for cost control: Empirical evidence for utility services in Norway," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1035-1054, August.
  7. Fredriksson, Per G. & Wollscheid, Jim R., 2014. "Environmental decentralization and political centralization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 402-410.
  8. Per G. Fredriksson & Jim R. Wollscheid, 2014. "Political Institutions, Political Careers and Environmental Policy," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 54-73, February.
  9. Benczes, István, 2008. "A költségvetési hiány politikai gazdaságtana [The political economy of budgetary deficit]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 218-232.
  10. Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200421, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  11. Aghion, Philippe & Hémous, David & Kharroubi, Enisse, 2014. "Cyclical fiscal policy, credit constraints, and industry growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41-58.
  12. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2006. "Why are there serial defaulters? Quasi-experimental evidence from Constitutions," WEF Working Papers 0003, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
  13. Catherine Dehon & Marjorie Gassner & Vincenzo Verardi, 2009. "Beware of ‘Good’ Outliers and Overoptimistic Conclusions," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(3), pages 437-452, June.
  14. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Davide Castellani, 2003. "Investments Abroad and Performance at Home Evidence from Italian Multinationals," Development Working Papers 180, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
  15. Per Fredriksson & Jim Wollscheid, 2007. "Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 381-393, March.
  16. Henning, Christian H.C.A., 2008. "Determinants of Agricultural Protection in an International Perspective: The Role of Political Institutions," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43872, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  17. Tsani, Stella, 2013. "Natural resources, governance and institutional quality: The role of resource funds," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 181-195.
  18. Suzana Makreshanska-Mladenovska & Goran Petrevski, 2019. "Fiscal Decentralisation and Government Size: Evidence from a Panel of European Countries," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 229(2), pages 33-58, June.
  19. Stela Cani, 2009. "Resource Abundance, Mineral Funds and Institutional Quality," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2009-04, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
  20. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2004. "Electoral rules and environmental policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 237-244, August.
  21. John Ashworth & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Decentralization as a constraint to Leviathan: a panel cointegration analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 491-516, September.
  22. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Parties Matter in Allocating Expenditures: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 652, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  23. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
  24. Nisticò, Roberto, 2022. "Political institutions and economic development over more than a century," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 199-215.
  25. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.
  26. Ryan H Murphy, 2022. "The constitution of ambiguity: The effects of constitutions on economic freedom," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 240-258, June.
  27. Pfeil, Christian F., 2016. "Electoral system change and spending: Four quantitative case studies," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 16/06, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  28. Per Fredriksson & Jim Wollscheid, 2015. "Legal Origins and Climate Change Policies in Former Colonies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 309-327, October.
  29. Simon Hug, 2003. "The State That Wasn't There," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 121-134, March.
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