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Citations for "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

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  1. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 152-167.
  3. Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  10. Michel Cavagnac, 2005. "Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(8), pages 499-512.
  11. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  12. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  13. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  14. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  15. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Engelmann, Dirk & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2013. "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 9544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Hori, Kazumi, 2005. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," Discussion Papers 2005-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  24. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  25. Kazumi Hori, 2014. "Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case," KIER Working Papers 888, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  26. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
  27. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  28. Erling Røed Larsen & Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2006. "The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord Characteristics and Interaction," Discussion Papers 467, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
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