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Citations for "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

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  1. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
  2. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  5. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  7. Hori, Kazumi, 2005. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," Discussion Papers 2005-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  9. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
  12. Erling Røed Larsen & Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2006. "The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord Characteristics and Interaction," Discussion Papers 467, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
  13. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  14. Hoffmann, Timo & Renes, Sander, 2016. "Flip a coin or vote : an Experiment on choosing group decision," Working Papers 16-11, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  15. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), : The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  18. Dirk Engelmann & Hans Peter Grüner, 2017. "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 6405, CESifo Group Munich.
  19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  20. Yukio Koriyama & Peter Gruner, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Post-Print hal-00689774, HAL.
  21. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  22. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9889.
  23. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  24. Michel Cavagnac, 2005. "Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(8), pages 499-512.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  28. Schweizer, Urs, 1998. "Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results," Discussion Paper Serie A 590, University of Bonn, Germany.
  29. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
  30. Kazumi Hori, 2014. "Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case," KIER Working Papers 888, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  31. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.