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Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ana CARP, 2017. "Wage correlation with consumer price index – Compensation and indexing," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(11), pages 54-64, November.
  2. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
  3. Pareja-Alcaraz, Pablo, 2017. "Chinese investments in Southern Europe's energy sectors: Similarities and divergences in China's strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 700-710.
  4. Ibrahim M. Menshawy & Rohaida Basiruddin & Nor‐Aiza Mohd‐Zamil & Khaled Hussainey, 2023. "Strive towards investment efficiency among Egyptian companies: Do board characteristics and information asymmetry matter?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 2382-2403, July.
  5. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi & Guido Ferrarini, 2017. "Executive remuneration standards and the “conformity gap” at controlled corporations," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 573-597, September.
  6. Deng, Kebin & Peng, Jiaxin & Peng, Juan & Zhang, Yuhua, 2022. "Real options with overextrapolation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  7. J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & Maria Belda-Ruiz & Gregorio Sanchez-Marin, 2017. "An executive hierarchy analysis of stock options: Does gender matter?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 737-766, October.
  8. Andres, Christian & Fernau, Erik & Theissen, Erik, 2014. "Should I stay or should I go? Former CEOs as monitors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 26-47.
  9. Dylan Minor, 2016. "Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-076, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2016.
  10. Huang, Hsing-Hua & Huang, Hongming & Shih, Pai-Ta, 2012. "Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2389-2402.
  11. Ann-Christine Schulz & Miriam Flickinger, 2020. "Does CEO (over)compensation influence corporate reputation?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 903-927, August.
  12. Viput Ongsakul & Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam & Sirimon Treepongkaruna & Pornsit Jiraporn, 2022. "Does board gender diversity reduce ‘CEO luck’?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 243-260, March.
  13. Carlo Cambini & Sara De Masi & Laura Rondi, 2013. "Incentive Compensation and Incentive Regulation: Empirical Evidence," IEFE Working Papers 58, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  14. Albring, Susan M. & Khurana, Inder K. & Nejadmalayeri, Ali & Pereira, Raynolde, 2011. "Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1445-1456.
  15. Sarkar, Sudipto, 2023. "Optimal restrictiveness of a financing covenant," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
  16. Wang, Liangcheng & Chen, Yizheng, 2025. "Artificial intelligence and corporate investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  17. Kim, Hwa-Sung, 2013. "Executive bonus compensation when abnormal earnings and the state of the economy are correlated," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 58-65.
  18. Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel & Belda-Ruiz, Maria & Sanchez-Marin, Gregorio, 2015. "Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 451-463.
  19. Cambini, Carlo & De Masi, Sara & Paci, Andrea & Rondi, Laura, 2018. "CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 474-488.
  20. Tian, Ni & Zhang, Zongyi, 2018. "How do anticorruption measures affect executive incentive?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 179-185.
  21. Morikawa, Masayuki, 2015. "Are large headquarters unproductive?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 422-436.
  22. Omar Farooque & Wonlop Buachoom & Nam Hoang, 2019. "Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian market," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 1111-1164, December.
  23. Arvidsson, Susanne & Eierle, Brigitte & Hartlieb, Sven, 2024. "Job satisfaction and investment efficiency – Evidence from crowdsourced employer reviews," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 266-280.
  24. Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
  25. Carlo Cambini & Sara De Masi & Laura Rondi, 2016. "CEO incentives in European energy utilities: evidence from regulated versus unregulated firms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 43(2), pages 127-155, June.
  26. Shang, Xiaodan & Luo, Chuanjian & Wen, Qian, 2020. "Do Chinese executives reward for luck?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 318-325.
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