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Executive bonus compensation when abnormal earnings and the state of the economy are correlated

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  • Kim, Hwa-Sung

Abstract

This paper investigates executive earnings-based bonuses in a general equilibrium economy. Unlike the existing study, combining the two frameworks in the fields of accounting and economics allows us to examine different earnings characteristics determined by the correlation between normal/abnormal earnings and the state of the economy. We derive a formula for the cost of executive earnings-based bonuses and obtain two key findings. First, we show that the typical bonus plan is beneficial to both shareholders and executives. To decrease the volatility of their wealth, shareholders prefer countercyclical earnings. Under this typical bonus plan, executives with countercyclical earnings can be greatly rewarded. Second, we find that the correlation between abnormal earnings and the state of the economy has a greater impact on bonuses than does the correlation between normal earnings and the state of the economy. This finding suggests that it is important to consider the relationship between abnormal earnings and the state of the economy when compensating an executive through an earnings-based bonus.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Hwa-Sung, 2013. "Executive bonus compensation when abnormal earnings and the state of the economy are correlated," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 58-65.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:58-65
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.01.038
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kutlu, Levent & Nair-Reichert, Usha, 2022. "Executive compensation and the potential for additional efficiency gains: Evidence from the Indian manufacturing sector," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Yarram, Subba Reddy & Rice, John, 2017. "Executive compensation among Australian mining and non-mining firms: Risk taking, long and short-term incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 211-220.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive compensation; Earnings-based bonus; Abnormal earnings; Jump-diffusion process; General equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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