IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ecl/prirpe/9-13-2010.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

The War of Information

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer, 2020. "Experimenting with Career Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 260-288, February.
  2. Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud Déllis, 2016. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
  3. Gieczewski, Germán, 2025. "Evolving wars of attrition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  4. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  5. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
  6. Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Competition in Signaling," MPRA Paper 106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Millner, Antony & Ollivier, Hélène & Simon, Leo, 2020. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  8. Stephane Wolton, 2015. "Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 570-587, October.
  9. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
  10. Starkov, Egor, 2023. "Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  11. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
  13. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
  14. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018. "Hierarchical experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 365-404.
  15. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
  16. Denter, Philipp, 2020. "Campaign contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  17. Jacqueline Sanchez-Rabaza & Jose Maria Rocha-Martinez & Julio B. Clempner, 2023. "Characterizing Manipulation via Machiavellianism," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-19, September.
  18. Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2013. "Gambling in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2033-2048.
  19. Lucchese, Elena & Roberti, Paolo, 2024. "When citizens legalize drugs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  20. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Gentzkow, Matthew & Kamenica, Emir, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 411-429.
  22. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  23. Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
  24. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  25. Quan Li & Kang Rong, 2024. "Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 525-545, June.
  26. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2023. "Policy experimentation with repeated elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 623-644.
  27. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
  28. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2016. "Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 181-215, July.
  29. Lang, Ruitian, 2019. "Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1057-1093.
  30. Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  31. Doron Klunover & John Morgan, 2019. "A Model of Presidential Debates," Papers 1907.01362, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
  32. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
  33. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
  34. Julio B. Clempner, 2025. "Manipulation Game Considering No-Regret Strategies," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-18, January.
  35. Kolb, Aaron M., 2015. "Optimal entry timing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 973-1000.
  36. Daniel Houser & Jian Song, 2021. "Costly Waiting in Dynamic Contests: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 1082, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  37. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.