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The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2019. "Financing Capacity with Stealing and Shirking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5128-5141, November.
  2. Felipe Balmaceda, 2020. "Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 601-637, June.
  3. Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  4. Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022. "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
  5. Sunil Dutta & Qintao Fan, 2025. "Innovation incentives and competition for corporate resources," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 2635-2672, September.
  6. Andres Zambrano, 2019. "Motivating informed decisions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 645-664, April.
  7. Chaparro, Alejandra & Galilea, Patricia & Muñoz, Juan Carlos & Poblete, Joaquín, 2020. "Application of an incentive for bus drivers to achieve an improvement in the quality of service," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  8. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Zhang, Jun, 2022. "Tournaments with Reserve Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17107, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  9. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Bonus pools and the informativeness principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
  10. Alice Peng‐Ju Su, 2017. "Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 231-256, February.
  11. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
  12. Poblete, Joaquín & Spulber, Daniel, 2017. "Managing innovation: Optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 38-61.
  13. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting under unverifiable monetary costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 892-909, October.
  14. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2021. "Goal-oriented agents in a market," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  15. Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan, 2021. "Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 374-386.
  16. Spulber, Daniel F., 2012. "Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 641-653.
  17. Jan Starmans, 2023. "Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3003-3024, May.
  18. Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 627-651, September.
  19. Leif Sörensen & Jan Schlüter, 2021. "How do contract types and incentives influence driver behavior?−An analysis of the Kigali bus network," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.
  20. Felipe Balmaceda, 2012. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Documentos de Trabajo 291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  21. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  22. Anja Schöttner, 2017. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1529-1544, May.
  23. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
  24. Leon Yang Chu & Guoming Lai, 2013. "Salesforce Contracting Under Demand Censorship," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(2), pages 320-334, May.
  25. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  26. Jiajia Cong & Wen Zhou, 2021. "Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 49-71, September.
  27. Mario Tirelli, 2017. "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0230, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
  28. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  29. Kirkegaard, René, 2023. "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  30. Michael T. Rauh, 2025. "Innovating Yourself Out of a Job," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 31-69, March.
  31. Barron, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2020. "Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  32. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
  33. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2018. "Financing Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: An Optimal Contracting Approach," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 85-96, February.
  34. Eric S. Chou & Chien-Lung Chen, 2015. "Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1069-1090, October.
  35. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2013. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
  36. Christian Hofmann & Steven Huddart & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2023. "An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1657-1689, September.
  37. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
  38. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagn� & Sandrine Spaeter, 2018. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 79-107.
  39. Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
  40. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10143, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  41. Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
  42. Majid Mahzoon & Ali Shourideh & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2023. "Indicator Choice in Pay-for-Performance," Papers 2307.12457, arXiv.org.
  43. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
  44. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  45. Jimenez Martinez, Antonio & Melguizo Lopez, Isabel, 2026. "Affecting Distributions of Opinions with Evidence," MPRA Paper 128334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  46. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  47. Chu, Xiang & Liu, Jun & Ren, Long & Gong, Daqing, 2020. "Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
  48. Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018. "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 7/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
  49. Sze-chuan Suen & Diana Negoescu & Joel Goh, 2022. "Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1691-1716, May.
  50. Guangdong Wu & Jian Zuo & Xianbo Zhao, 2017. "Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(7), pages 1-20, July.
  51. Juan Camilo Serpa & Harish Krishnan, 2017. "The Strategic Role of Business Insurance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 384-404, February.
  52. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2014. "Financing capacity investment under demand uncertainty," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-14-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  53. Mario Tirelli, 2021. "On the optimal investment finance of small businesses," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1639-1665, April.
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