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Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Buonanno, Paolo & Ferrari, Irene & Saia, Alessandro, 2024. "All is not lost: Organized crime and social capital formation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
  2. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo & Stimolo, Marco, 2024. "Neutralizing the tentacles of organized crime. Assessment of the impact of an anti-crime measure on mafia violence in Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 57-85.
  3. Hoekman, Bernard & Onur Taş, Bedri Kamil, 2024. "Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
  4. Gallego, Jorge & Prem, Mounu & Vargas, Juan F., 2020. "Corruption in the Times of Pandemia," Working papers 43, Red Investigadores de Economía.
  5. repec:osf:socarx:sr6ep_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2026. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 116(2), pages 535-581, February.
  7. Margaryta Klymak & Tim Vlandas, 2024. "Governance in times of war: Public procurement in Ukraine," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(6), pages 1-15, June.
  8. Fontana, Stefania & d’Agostino, Giorgio, 2025. "Threshold of shadows: Unveiling organised crime in Italian municipal public procurement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 90(PB).
  9. Pinotti, Paolo, 2020. "The credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of crime," CEPR Discussion Papers 14850, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  10. Cingano, Federico & Palomba, Filippo & Pinotti, Paolo & Rettore, Enrico, 2022. "Making Subsidies Work: Rules vs. Discretion," CEPR Discussion Papers 17004, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  11. Arellano-Bover, Jaime & De Simoni, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Macchiavello, Rocco & Marchetti, Domenico J. & Prem, Mounu, 2024. "Mafias and Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 16893, IZA Network @ LISER.
    • Arellano-Bover, Jaime & De Simoni, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Macchiavello, Rocco & Marchetti, Domenico J. & Prem, Mounu, 2024. "Mafias and Firms," SocArXiv sr6ep, Center for Open Science.
    • Jaime Arellano-Bover & Marco De Simoni & Luigi Guiso & Rocco Macchiavello & Domenico J. Marchetti & Mounu Prem, 2026. "Mafias and Firms," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 26130, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    • Arellano-Bover, Jaime & De Simoni, Marco & Guiso, Luigi & Macchiavello, Rocco & Marchetti, Domenico J. & Prem, Mounu, 2024. "Mafias and Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 18982, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Jaime Arellano-Bover & Marco De Simoni & Luigi Guiso & Rocco Macchiavello & Domenico J. Marchetti & Mounu Prem, 2024. "Mafias and Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 11043, CESifo.
  12. Tancredi Buscemi & Giulia Romani, 2022. "Allocation of authority and tactical redistribution of public investments: A historical quasi-experiment," Working Papers 2022:18, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2024.
  13. Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2021. "Centralized procurement and delivery times: Evidence from a natural experiment in Italy," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-063, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  14. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
  15. Titl, Vitezslav & De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny, 2021. "Political donations, public procurement and government efficiency," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
  16. Paolo Pinotti, 0. "The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 0, pages 1-14.
  17. Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024. "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers 413554011, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  18. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio & Domenica Romeo, 2024. "If You Give Bureaucrats an Inch, Will They Take a Yard? Lessons from Threshold Regulatory Reform in Italy," Public Finance Review, , vol. 52(6), pages 727-764, November.
  19. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona School of Economics.
  20. Mishra, Ajit & Samuel, Andrew, 2024. "Bribery and temptation: More red tape or more discretion?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 641-655.
  21. Belev, S. & Veterinarov, V. & Matveev, E., 2023. "Vertical collusion in public procurement: Estimation based on data for R&D composite auctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 36-63.
  22. Tukiainen, Janne & Blesse, Sebastian & Bohne, Albrecht & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Jääskeläinen, Jan & Luukinen, Ari & Sieppi, Antti, 2024. "What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
  23. Alessandra Fenizia & Raffaele Saggio, 2023. "Organized Crime and Economic Growth: Evidence from Municipalities Infiltrated by the Mafia," NBER Working Papers 32002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Vitezslav Titl, 2023. "The One and Only: Single-Bidding in Public Procurement," Working Papers 2308, Utrecht School of Economics.
  25. Baraldi, Anna Laura & Cantabene, Claudia & De Iudicibus, Alessandro, 2024. "Fighting crime to improve recycling: Evaluating an anti-mafia policy on source separation of waste," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  26. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro & Calogero Guccio, 2021. "Does greater discretion improve the performance in the execution of public works? Evidence from the reform of discretionary thresholds in Italy," Working papers 108, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
  27. Colonnelli, Emanuele & Lagaras, Spyridon & Ponticelli, Jacopo & Prem, Mounu & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Revealing corruption: Firm and worker level evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1097-1119.
  28. Guo, Yuchen & Liang, Pinghan, 2025. "Budget rollover and year-end spending in China: evidence from public procurement contracts," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(PA).
  29. Xun, Yang, 2024. "Corruption and Talent Allocation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1526, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  30. Liu, Kevin Zhengcheng & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2025. "Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
  31. Lisciandra, Maurizio & Milani, Riccardo & Millemaci, Emanuele, 2022. "A corruption risk indicator for public procurement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  32. Paolo Pinotti, 2020. "The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(2), pages 207-220, July.
  33. Nannan Wang & Naixiao Cui & Junlin Hao & Yilin Chai, 2025. "The Role of Government Procurement in Sustainable Industry Development—The Trends and Research Agenda," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-23, February.
  34. Marly Tatiana Celis Galvez & Vitezslav Titl & Fredo Schotanus, 2025. "Discretion and political favoritism: Evidence from two reforms in public procurement," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 91(3), pages 915-968, January.
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