IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/aea/aecrev/v106y2016i9p2742-59.html

The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Robert S. Gibbons & Manuel Grieder & Holger Herz & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Building an Equilibrium: Rules Versus Principles in Relational Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 7871, CESifo.
  2. repec:cam:camjip:2101 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Felipe Brugués, 2026. "Take the Goods and Run: Contracting Frictions and Market Power in Supply Chains," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 116(2), pages 582-626, February.
  4. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2019. "Trust, investment and competition: theory and evidence from German car manufacturers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7680, CESifo.
  5. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2020. "Precontractual investment and modes of procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
  6. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad Stahl, 2024. "Trust in Vertical Relations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_530, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  7. Daniel Barron & Yingni Guo, 0. "The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 136(1), pages 471-504.
  8. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
  9. Daniel Barron & Jin Li & Michał Zator, 2022. "Morale and Debt Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4496-4516, June.
  10. Yonghang Ji & Allen Vong, 2025. "Task assignment as dynamic incentives," Papers 2511.05338, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
  11. O'Connor, Neale G. & Romero, Jorge & Asiaei, Kaveh, 2026. "Benchmarking supplier performance: How scorecard comparisons and supply risk influence termination decisions," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 291(C).
  12. Tukiainen, Janne & Blesse, Sebastian & Bohne, Albrecht & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Jääskeläinen, Jan & Luukinen, Ari & Sieppi, Antti, 2024. "What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
  13. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022. "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  14. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad, 2017. "Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers 12267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  16. Deligiannis, Michalis & Liberopoulos, George & Benioudakis, Myron, 2023. "Dynamic supplier competition and cooperation for buyer loyalty on service," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 255(C).
  17. Beomjun Kim, 2025. "Effect of a Manager in Relational Contracts with Multiple Workers," Papers 2504.21264, arXiv.org.
  18. Cristina Nistor & Matthew Selove, 2020. "Pricing and Quality Provision in a Supply Relationship: A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(5), pages 939-955, September.
  19. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
  20. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2025. "To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 146(2), pages 237-262, October.
  21. Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 673-700.
  22. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2021. "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_316, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  23. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.
  24. Utgoff, Naomi M., 2025. "Information-based discrimination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 20-30.
  25. Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
  26. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F. Garrett, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 1025-1075, May.
  27. Liberopoulos, George & Deligiannis, Michalis, 2022. "Optimal supplier inventory control policies when buyer purchase incidence is driven by past service," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(3), pages 917-936.
  28. Leduc, Mathieu V., 2024. "Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 27-53.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.