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Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex


  • Wolfgang F. Koehler


I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang F. Koehler, 2005. "Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex," IEW - Working Papers 255, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:255

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, March.
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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