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Preisbindung als Kooperationsinstrument in Wertschöpfungsnetzwerken

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  • Wipprich, Mark
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    Im Mittelpunkt dieses IfG-Arbeitspapieres stehen Wertschöpfungsnetzwerke. Es handelt sich dabei um vertikale Kooperationen in einer bestimmten Ausgestaltung. Mitglieder sind rechtlich selbständige Unternehmen, die auf mindestens zwei aufeinander folgenden Wertschöpfungsstufen zusammenarbeiten. Dabei sind auf mindestens einer Stufe zwei Unternehmen tätig. In der Praxis sind solche Kooperationen weit verbreitet. Häufig haben sie Beziehungen zwischen Herstellern und Zulieferern zum Inhalt. Die Vereinbarung der Modalitäten des Austausches von Leistungsbeziehungen und der Bewertung der Leistungen der Kooperationspartner sind wichtige Elemente der Gestaltung der Governancestrukturen von Netzwerken. Sie beeinflussen nicht nur das wirtschaftliche Ergebnis der Kooperation, sondern auch die Verteilung der Kooperationsrente. Zusätzlich werden durch die konkreten Regelungen, die Anreize für kooperationsspezifische Investitionen beeinflusst. Mark Wipprich untersucht in diesem Papier in einem adäquaten modelltheoretischen Rahmen, welche Auswirkungen die Vereinbarung von Preisen für einen bestimmten Zeitraum auf die entsprechenden Verhaltensweisen der Kooperationspartner haben, welche Länge der optimale Preisbindungszeitraum aufweist und wie sich in Anhängigkeit davon die Kooperationsrenten auf die Partner verteilen. Zusätzlich werden die Fragen der optimalen Anzahl der Zulieferer sowie weiterer Kooperationsmerkmale und deren Auswirkungen gestellt. Obwohl es sich um ein einfaches Modell handelt, können wichtige Schlussfolgerungen für die Ausgestaltung von vertikalen Kooperationen dieses Typs abgeleitet werden, die durch die vorgeschlagenen Modellerweiterungen noch ergänzt werden können. Diese Arbeit stammt aus dem IfG-Forschungscluster II: Unternehmenskooperationen. Die Ergebnisse und der gewählte Weg der Erkenntnisgewinnung werden hiermit zur Diskussion gestellt.

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    Paper provided by University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives in its series Arbeitspapiere with number 60.

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    Date of creation: 2007
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:60
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