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No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior


  • Bartels, Bernd
  • Weder di Mauro, Beatrice
  • Eichengreen, Barry


Das vorliegende Manuskript untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Regeln zur finanziellen Unabhängigkeit von Zentralbanken und deren Finanzkraft. Wir studieren die Regeln und Bilanzdaten von 35 Zentralbanken in der OECD mit dem Ziel herauszuarbeiten, ob die Eigentümerstruktur der Bank (privat oder staatlich geführt), ihre Gewinnverteilungsregeln, Besteuerungsgesetze, Rückstellungsregeln und andere Bilanzierungsregeln die Höhe von Gewinnen, deren Verteilung, sowie die Höhe der Reserven beeinflusst.

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  • Bartels, Bernd & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Eichengreen, Barry, 2017. "No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168251, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168251

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Buiter, Willem H., 2008. "Can Central Banks Go Broke?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Marc Flandreau, Stefano Ugolini, 2011. "Where It All Began: Lending of Last Resort and the Bank of England during the Overend, Gurney Panic of 1866," IHEID Working Papers 04-2011, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    3. Del Negro, Marco & Sims, Christopher A., 2015. "When does a central bank׳s balance sheet require fiscal support?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-19.
    4. Studener, Werner & Merriman, Niall & Karakitsos, Polychronis & Bunea, Daniela, 2016. "Profit distribution and loss coverage rules for central banks," Occasional Paper Series 169, European Central Bank.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    6. Broz, J. Lawrence, 1998. "The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(02), pages 231-268, March.
    7. Peter Stella & Ulrich H Klueh, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance; An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 08/176, International Monetary Fund.
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    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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