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Choosing Who You Are: The Structure and Behavioral Effects of Revealed Identification Preferences

Listed author(s):
  • Hett, Florian
  • Kröll, Markus
  • Mechtel, Mario
Registered author(s):

    Social identity is an important driver of behavior. But where do difierences in social identity come from? We use a novel laboratory experiment based on a revealed preference approach to analyze how individuals choose their identity. Facing a trade-off between monetary payments and belonging to difierent groups, individuals are willing to forego significant earnings to avoid certain groups and thereby reveal their identification preferences. We then show that these identification preferences are systematically related to behavioral heterogeneity in group-specific social preferences. These results illustrate the importance of identification as a choice and its relevance for explaining individual behavior.

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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168223/1/VfS-2017-pid-3305-osp1.pdf
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    Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking with number 168223.

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    Date of creation: 2017
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168223
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.socialpolitik.org/
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