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Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs

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  • Rothbauer, Julia
  • Sieg, Gernot

Abstract

This study analyzes the minimum quality standard set by the European Union (EU) through Regulation 1371/2007 of Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations. A welfare maximizing quality standard raises quality and consumer satisfaction, but does not improve the modal split of rail transport. A minimum quality standard determined by political majorities may or may not increase welfare. However, all binding standards induce travelers to switch to transport modes with higher anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rothbauer, Julia & Sieg, Gernot, 2010. "Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs," Economics Department Working Paper Series 8, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tbswps:8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; minimum quality standards; median; rail;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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