Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs
This study analyzes the minimum quality standard set by the European Union (EU) through Regulation 1371/2007 of Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations. A welfare maximizing quality standard raises quality and consumer satisfaction, but does not improve the modal split of rail transport. A minimum quality standard determined by political majorities may or may not increase welfare. However, all binding standards induce travelers to switch to transport modes with higher anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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