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Climate pledges and greenwashing: Information provision does not work

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Listed:
  • Battocletti, Vittoria
  • Desiato, Alfredo
  • Romano, Alessandro
  • Sotis, Chiara
  • Tröger, Tobias

Abstract

Many firms are making net-zero and carbon neutral pledges. In principle, these pledges should help consumers identify sustainable options, but often they do not correspond to meaningful actions. In response, both in the U.S. and in Europe, courts and policymakers are requiring firms to disclose more information regarding their climate pledges. This strategy assumes that consumers pay attention to the information provided, are able to understand it, and adjust their behavior accordingly. We test this assumption in two studies with representative samples of U.S. residents (N = 300, N = 1500) and a large-scale eyetracking study (N = 500). First, we show that while people are not aware of the meaning of the most common climate pledges, they are willing to pay a considerable premium for these claims, confirming that an unregulated market may lead to greenwashing. Second, we observe that information provision does not affect respondents when making consequential choices on how much to pay for gift cards of firms that have made a climate pledge. Third, we find that in a realistic setting where respondents receive multiple pieces of information about various products, information regarding climate pledges attracts significant attention. However, it does not improve understanding of climate pledges and actually increases recipients' confusion. Our results add to the growing evidence that individual frame interventions are not a viable shortcut to address systemic issues like global warming.

Suggested Citation

  • Battocletti, Vittoria & Desiato, Alfredo & Romano, Alessandro & Sotis, Chiara & Tröger, Tobias, 2025. "Climate pledges and greenwashing: Information provision does not work," SAFE Working Paper Series 447, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:316444
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5233205
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M38 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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