IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkpb/313630.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Europas Verteidigung finanzieren: Was lehrt uns die Geschichte?

Author

Listed:
  • Marzian, Johannes
  • Trebesch, Christoph

Abstract

Europa muss seine Militärausgaben deutlich erhöhen, aber wie? Diese Frage beantworten wir mit einem Blick in die Geschichte. Wie haben Regierungen in der Vergangenheit in ähnlichen Situationen reagiert? Wie wurden Aufrüstung und Kriege typischerweise finanziert - durch Schulden, Steuern oder Haushaltskürzungen? Hierzu sammeln und analysieren wir neue detaillierte Daten zu Staatsausgaben in 22 Ländern über einen Zeitraum von 150 Jahren. Unsere wichtigste Erkenntnis ist, dass Haushaltskürzungen, z.B. in Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten oder im sozialen Bereich, keine große Rolle spielten. Fast alle Aufrüstungen wurden kurzfristig über Defizite und höhere Steuereinnahmen finanziert. Je größer die Aufrüstung, desto stärker die Schuldenfinanzierung. Im Einklang mit ökonomischer Theorie sollten Deutschland und Europa die erhöhten Verteidigungsausgaben kurzfristig über Schulden finanzieren. Um die zusätzliche Schuldenlast zu bewältigen, könnten mittelfristig die Steuern erhöht, Subventionen und Steuervermeidung reduziert, und das Wachstum der Sozialausgaben begrenzt werden. Fiskalregeln dürfen der Verteidigung Europas nicht entgegenstehen. Ein warnendes Beispiel ist Großbritannien in den 1930ern, das auf Appeasement und eine "schwarze Null" setzte, statt die Militärausgaben zu erhöhen. Dies führte dazu, dass Großbritannien unzureichend vorbereitet war, als Nazi-Deutschland angriff. Wir sollten den schwerwiegenden Fehler Großbritanniens der 1930er vermeiden und heute ausreichend in Verteidigung investieren, um Russland abzuschrecken. Verteidigungsausgaben sollten daher von den Fiskalregeln ausgenommen werden, sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Europa. Eine weniger klare Alternative wären neue Schuldenfonds, etwa ein europäischer Finanzierungsmechanismus oder ein weiteres deutsches Sondervermögen.

Suggested Citation

  • Marzian, Johannes & Trebesch, Christoph, 2025. "Europas Verteidigung finanzieren: Was lehrt uns die Geschichte?," Kiel Policy Brief 184, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:313630
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/313630/1/1919738274.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ohanian, Lee E, 1997. "The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States: World War II and the Korean War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 23-40, March.
    2. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
    4. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
    5. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2020. "Debt and Taxes in Eight U.S. Wars and Two Insurrections," NBER Working Papers 27115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Scheve, Kenneth & Stasavage, David, 2010. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 529-561, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marzian, Johannes & Trebesch, Christoph, 2025. "How to finance Europe's military buildup? Lessons from history," Kiel Policy Brief 184, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Douglas Kriner & Breanna Lechase & Rosella Cappella Zielinski, 2018. "Self-interest, partisanship, and the conditional influence of taxation on support for war in the USA," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(1), pages 43-64, January.
    3. Quadrini, Vincenzo & de Francisco, Eva & Azzimonti, Marina, 2012. "Financial Globalization, Inequality, and the Raising of Public Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 8893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Siu, Henry E., 2008. "The fiscal role of conscription in the U.S. World War II effort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1094-1112, September.
    5. Martin Fernando M., 2012. "Government Policy Response to War-Expenditure Shocks," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-40, July.
    6. Ellen R. M cG rattan & Lee E. Ohanian, 2010. "Does Neoclassical Theory Account For The Effects Of Big Fiscal Shocks? Evidence From World War Ii," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 509-532, May.
    7. Carolina Achury & Christos Koulovatianos & John D. Tsoukalas, 2011. "External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption," CESifo Working Paper Series 3532, CESifo.
    8. repec:ecb:ecbops:2014165 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Guillaume Vandenbroucke, 2023. "On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare," Working Papers 2023-007, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised Jul 2024.
    10. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2020. "Debt and Taxes in Eight U.S. Wars and Two Insurrections," NBER Working Papers 27115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Dieppe, Alistair & Mourinho Félix, Ricardo & Marchiori, Luca & Grech, Owen & Albani, Maria & Lalouette, Laure & Kulikov, Dmitry & Papadopoulou, Niki & Sideris, Dimitris & Irac, Delphine & Gordo Mora, , 2015. "Public debt, population ageing and medium-term growth," Occasional Paper Series 165, European Central Bank.
    12. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Policy with Dispersed Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 11-60, March.
    13. Pintér, Gábor, 2022. "The procyclicality of inflation-linked debt," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    14. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    15. Marcet, Albert & Scott, Andrew & Faraglia, Elisa, 2014. "Modelling Long Bonds - The Case of Optimal Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 243-257.
    17. Maxime Menuet & Alexandru Minea & Patrick Villieu, 2019. "The Peril of Fiscal Rules," Post-Print hal-02314996, HAL.
    18. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis, 2002. "Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1295-1328.
    19. Gorostiaga, Arantza, 2003. "Should fiscal policy be different in a non-competitive framework?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1311-1331, September.
    20. Christopher Sleet, 2004. "Optimal Taxation with Private Government Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1217-1239.
    21. Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002. "Indexation, Inflation and Monetary Policy: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Fernando Lefort & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Serie (ed.),Indexation, Inflation and MOnetary Policy, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 1, pages 001-018, Central Bank of Chile.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:313630. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.