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Patronage-Preserving Federalism? Legislative Malapportionment and Subnational Fiscal Policies in Argentina

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  • Gordin, Jorge P.

Abstract

This paper builds on institutional analysis to generate new conclusions about the economic viability of federalism. It does so by suggesting that Weingast's seminal model of marketpreserving federalism falls short of accounting for the poor fiscal performance of multitiered systems in the developing world. This theoretical deficiency stems to a large extent from the insufficient attention paid by this model to the institutional complexity of federal systems, particularly the public policy effects of legislative malapportionment. Subsequent to an analytical discussion of the potential public spending and distributive politics distortions resulting from overrepresentation, we offer preliminary empirical evidence from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. The findings show not only that said imbalances lead to sub-optimal fiscal results but also that they have a mutually-reinforcing relationship with regionalized patronage.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordin, Jorge P., 2007. "Patronage-Preserving Federalism? Legislative Malapportionment and Subnational Fiscal Policies in Argentina," GIGA Working Papers 52, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:52
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Samuels, David & Snyder, Richard, 2001. "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 651-671, October.
    6. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    7. Horiuchi, Yusaku, 2004. "Malapportionment and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(01), pages 179-183, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:5:y:2013:i:1:p:127-150 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Taeko Hiroi, 2019. "Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(4), pages 642-670.
    3. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2020. "Persistent Effects of Colonial Institutions on Long‐Run Development: Local Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Design in Argentina," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 820-861, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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