The economics of debt clearing mechanisms
We examine the evolution of decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms from the 13th to the 18th century; in particular, we explore the clearing of non- or limitedtradable debts like bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse mechanisms, similar to the models in the theoretical matching literature, and show that specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre, skontrieren or virement des parties used by merchants were efficient in specific historical contexts. We can explain both the evolutionary self-organizing emergence of late medieval and early modern fairs, and its robustness during the 17th and 18th century.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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- Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2011.
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- Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2010. "Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching," CEP Discussion Papers dp1034, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2010. "Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-060, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003.
Game Theory and Information
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- William Roberds & Stephen Quinn, 2007. "The Bank of Amsterdam and the Leap to Central Bank Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 262-265, May.
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- Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2008.
"The economic history of sovereignty: communal responsibility, the extended family, and the firm,"
Economic History Working Papers
22307, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, 2009. "The Economic History of Sovereignty: Communal Responsibility, the Extended Family, and the Firm," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 99-112, March.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
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