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On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol

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  • Bolle, Friedel

Abstract

The launch of a public project requires support from enough members of a group. Members (players) are differently important for the project and have different cost/benefit relations. There are players who profit and players who suffer from the launch of the project. Examples are the Kyoto protocol, voting with different weights (shareholders, the UN with the veto power of the Security Council members), and international scientific or military expeditions. As coordination on one of the usually many pure strategy equilibria is difficult, mixed strategy equilibria are the focus of this investigation. If all players profit from the launch of the project then, despite the unnecessary costs, the requirement of full contributions is a Pareto-improvement to every original threshold. The contribution probabilities of some player types defined by their importance are characterized according to their cost/benefit relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolle, Friedel, 2014. "On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol," Discussion Papers 345, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:345
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bischi, Gian Italo & Merlone, Ugo & Pruscini, Eros, 2018. "Evolutionary dynamics in club goods binary games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 104-119.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Threshold Public Goods; Provision Point Mechanism; Voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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