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Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Kritikos, Alexander S.
  • Vigenina, Denitsa

Abstract

We empirically examine the efficacy of various incentives of microlending contracts such as joint-liability or group access to future loans. We find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. Furthermore, the incentive system leads to peer measures between the borrowers, helping the lender to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. We also demonstrate that the mechanism realizes high repayment rates, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we show that dynamic incentives have to be restricted if the two problems of joint-liability are to be tackled notably.

Suggested Citation

  • Kritikos, Alexander S. & Vigenina, Denitsa, 2005. "Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 231, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
    2. Van Tassel, Eric, 1999. "Group lending under asymmetric information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 3-25, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joel M. Guttman, 2006. "Repayment Performance in Group Lending Programs: A Survey," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-01, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    2. Dufhues, Thomas & Buchenrieder, Gertrud & Quoc, Hoang Dinh & Munkung, Nuchanata, 2011. "Social capital and loan repayment performance in Southeast Asia," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 679-691.
    3. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "The economics of solidarity: A conceptual framework," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 73-89, February.
    4. Alexander S. Kritikos & Christoph Kneiding & Claas Christian Germelmann, 2006. "Is there a Market for Micro-Lending in Industrialized Countries? - Evidence from Germany," Working Papers 0003, Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmarktaktivierung (GfA).
    5. Kritikos Alexander & Kneiding Christoph & Germelmann Claas Christian, 2009. "Demand Side Analysis of Microlending Markets in Germany," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 229(5), pages 523-543, October.
    6. Thomas Dufhues & Gertrud Buchenrieder & Hoang Dinh Quoc, 2012. "Social capital and loan repayment performance in Northern Vietnam," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 43(3), pages 277-292, May.
    7. Chmelíková, Gabriela & Krauss, Annette & Dvouletý, Ondřej, 2019. "Performance of microfinance institutions in Europe—Does social capital matter?," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Bhatnagar Deepali & Yadav Kajal, 2023. "A Study on Loan Delinquency of the Self Help Group-Bank Linkage Programme in Rural Rajasthan," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 23(2), pages 86-101, December.
    9. Yan Liu & Guang???Zhen Sun, 2008. "Competition And Access Regulation In The Telecommunications Industry With Multiple Networks," Monash Economics Working Papers 25/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Vittoria Cerasi & Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, 2009. "Solidarity Behind Microfinance," Working Papers 20091101, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica.
    11. Dyuti Banerjee & Anupama Sethi, 2008. "Intra-Group Transfers And Group Formation," Monash Economics Working Papers 24/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    12. Kurosaki, Takashi & Khan, Hidayat Ullah, 2011. "Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic Default and Covariate Shocks:Evidence from Pakistan," PRIMCED Discussion Paper Series 10, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    13. Jeffrey Carpenter & Tyler Williams, 2010. "Moral hazard, peer monitoring, and microcredit: field experimental evidence from Paraguay," Working Papers 10-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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