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Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Alexander S. Kritikos
  • Denitsa Vigenina

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100% if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term problems of the joint-liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander S. Kritikos & Denitsa Vigenina, 2005. "Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 213-238, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:213-238
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van Tassel, Eric, 1999. "Group lending under asymmetric information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 3-25, October.
    2. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joel M. Guttman, 2006. "Repayment Performance in Group Lending Programs: A Survey," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-01, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    2. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "The economics of solidarity: A conceptual framework," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 73-89, February.
    3. Alexander S. Kritikos & Christoph Kneiding & Claas Christian Germelmann, 2006. "Is there a Market for Micro-Lending in Industrialized Countries? - Evidence from Germany," Working Papers 0003, Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmarktaktivierung (GfA).
    4. Kritikos Alexander & Kneiding Christoph & Germelmann Claas Christian, 2009. "Demand Side Analysis of Microlending Markets in Germany," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 229(5), pages 523-543, October.
    5. Yan Liu & Guang???Zhen Sun, 2008. "Competition And Access Regulation In The Telecommunications Industry With Multiple Networks," Monash Economics Working Papers 25/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    6. Vittoria Cerasi & Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, 2009. "Solidarity Behind Microfinance," Working Papers 20091101, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica.
    7. Dyuti Banerjee & Anupama Sethi, 2008. "Intra-Group Transfers And Group Formation," Monash Economics Working Papers 24/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Kurosaki, Takashi & Khan, Hidayat Ullah, 2011. "Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic Default and Covariate Shocks:Evidence from Pakistan," PRIMCED Discussion Paper Series 10, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    9. Jeffrey Carpenter & Tyler Williams, 2010. "Moral hazard, peer monitoring, and microcredit: field experimental evidence from Paraguay," Working Papers 10-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    10. Thomas Dufhues & Gertrud Buchenrieder & Hoang Dinh Quoc, 2012. "Social capital and loan repayment performance in Northern Vietnam," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 43(3), pages 277-292, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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