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Who governs the business association?

Author

Listed:
  • Egerod, Benjamin C. K.
  • Libgober, Brian
  • Thieme, Sebastian

Abstract

Business associations play an important role transmitting elite opinion to policymakers. But who do these groups really represent and why? We examine these questions in the context of the U.S. by using qualitative and quantitative methods. Our extensive data collection involves IRS filings, tax returns linked to BoardEx and LobbyView, and other sources. While we find business associations are often premised on formal political equality, more oligarchical approaches such as resource proportional voting are not uncommon. Associations are often dependent on large firms for economic resources. Unsurprisingly then, large, politically active firms are over-represented on association boards. In addition, we show that among associations with oligarchical governance structures, representation on association boards has consequences for lobbying behavior. While membership on some association boards is remarkably sticky, most associations will lose a majority of their board members after four years. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that the governance arrangements of organized business interests are variable and exert an important influence on their behavior. Two case studies illustrate the downstream consequences for politics and policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Egerod, Benjamin C. K. & Libgober, Brian & Thieme, Sebastian, 2026. "Who governs the business association?," Working Papers 382, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:342512
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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