Collective and Random Fining versus Tax/Subsidy - Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Pollution: An Experimental Study
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More about this item
KeywordsNon-point source pollution; environmental policy; collective fining; random fining; tax-subsidy scheme; experiments;
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