Budget Balancing Incentive Mechanisms
Xepapadeas  develops a pollution abatement incentive mechanism that both reduces the information requirements of regulator and is "budget balancing" drawing only on the social gains from pollution abatement to encourage firm compliance. This paper demonstrates that, contrary to Xepapadeas , the budget balancing system of random penalties cannot be used induce compliance with the regulator's objectives if firms are risk neutral. However, the mechanism can be successfully applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse (Rasmusen ). Second, the paper explores the optimal design of the random fine system, including the choice of fines, penalty probabilities, and team size.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1992|
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