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Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders

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  • Nöldeke, Georg
  • Tröger, Thomas

Abstract

We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally distributed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nöldeke, Georg & Tröger, Thomas, 2001. "Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 1/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:12001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean-Luc Vila, 1994. "Insider Trading without Normality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 131-152.
    2. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    3. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    4. Back, Kerry, 1992. "Insider Trading in Continuous Time," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 387-409.
    5. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1993. "The Effect of Public Information and Competition on Trading Volume and Price Volatility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 23-56.
    6. Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1996. "Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 579-611, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bongaerts, Dion & Achter, Mark Van, 2021. "Competition among liquidity providers with access to high-frequency trading technology," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 220-249.
    2. Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Steen Ejerskov & Natacha Valla, 2007. "Manipulation in Money Markets," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 113-148, March.
    3. Wassim Daher & Harun Aydilek & Elias G. Saleeby, 2020. "Insider trading with different risk attitudes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(2), pages 123-147, October.
    4. Georg Nöldeke & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle-model," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 73-85, January.
    5. Nöldeke, Georg & Tröger, Thomas, 2004. "On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Rochet-Vila Model of Market Making," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    6. Grégoire, Philippe & Huang, Hui, 2012. "Information disclosure with leakages," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 2005-2010.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    insider trading; Kyle model; linear equilibrium; normal distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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