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Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders


  • Wassim Daher

    () (CERMSEM)

  • Leonard J. Mirman

    () (University of Virginia)


In this paper, we study a version of the static Jain-Mirman (2002) model in which competition in the real sector is introduced. In this paper, we add competition in the stock sector to the Jain-Mirman (2002) paper. We show that the linear equilibrium structure is affected by this competition in the financial sector. Specifically, we show that the stock price set by the market maker reveals more information and that the behaviour of the profits of the manager depends on the parameters of the model. Moreover, we prove that the level of output produced by the manager is less than in Jain-Mirman (2002). Finally, we also study the case in which the market maker receives only one signal and analyze the comparative statics of this model when the market maker receives either one or two signals.

Suggested Citation

  • Wassim Daher & Leonard J. Mirman, 2004. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04077

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean-Luc Vila, 1994. "Insider Trading without Normality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 131-152.
    2. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2007. "Market structure and insider trading," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 306-331.
    3. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
    4. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    5. James Dow, 2003. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(3), pages 439-454, July.
    6. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1022-1041, December.
    7. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1993. "The Effect of Public Information and Competition on Trading Volume and Price Volatility," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 23-56.
    8. Creane, Anthony, 1994. "Experimentation with Heteroskedastic Noise," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 275-286, March.
    9. Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
    10. Baiman, Stanley & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1995. "Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-121, July.
    11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    12. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-887, August.
    13. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    14. Michael Manove, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-845.
    15. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Insider trading with correlated signals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 105-113, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00676502 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Park, Young S. & Lee, Jaehyun, 2010. "Detecting insider trading: The theory and validation in Korea Exchange," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2110-2120, September.
    3. Wassim Daher & Harun Aydilek & Fida Karam & Asiye Aydilek, 2014. "Insider trading with product differentiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(2), pages 173-201, March.
    4. Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Mirman, Leonard J., 2012. "Insider trading with different market structures," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 143-154.
    5. Leonard F.S. Wang & Ya-Chin Wang, 2010. "Stackelberg real-leader in an insider trading model," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 30-46, March.
    6. Karam, Fida & Daher, Wassim, 2013. "Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 44-52.
    7. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Wang, Ya-Chin & Ren, Shuang, 2009. "Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 123-131, January.
    8. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00639657 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Insider trading; stock prices; correlated signals; Kyle model.;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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