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Insider trading with product differentiation

In this paper, we analyze the effect of Cournot competition with differentiated products on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm, with three different structures in the financial market : monopoly, duopoly and Stackelberg. We shows that the degree of product differentiation does not affect the results found in the literature on insider trading, concerning the effect of the financial market structure on firms' outputs, the revelation of information and the insiders' orders. Besides, firms' output, the amount of information revealed in the stock price, the insiders' trading orders and the owners' profits are independent of the degree of product differentiation. The real market structure through the degree of product differentiation is found to determine the level of the compensation scheme earned by the manager, the market makers' response to the total order flow signal as well as the managers' profits.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12014.pdf
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Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 12014.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12014
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  1. Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Mirman, Leonard J., 2012. "Insider trading with different market structures," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 143-154.
  2. Rochet, J.C. & Vila, J.L., 1993. "Insider Trading Without Normality," Papers 93.b, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  3. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-87, August.
  4. Wassim Daher & Leonard J. Mirman, 2004. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  5. RenÈ Caldentey & Ennio Stacchetti, 2010. "Insider Trading With a Random Deadline," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 245-283, 01.
  6. Liu, Hong & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2011. "Insider trading with public and shared information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1756-1762, July.
  7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1983. "Natural Oligopolies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1469-83, September.
  8. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Wang, Ya-Chin & Ren, Shuang, 2009. "Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 123-131, January.
  9. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2007. "Market structure and insider trading," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 306-331.
  10. Cheng, Louis T.W. & Davidson III, Wallace N. & Leung, T.Y., 2011. "Insider trading returns and dividend signals," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 421-429, June.
  11. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
  12. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1987. "Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 131-46, December.
  13. Manove, Michael, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-45, November.
  14. Wassim Daher & Fida Karam, 2011. "Insider Trading in a Two-Tier real market structure model," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00653971, HAL.
  15. Creane, Anthony, 1994. "Experimentation with Heteroskedastic Noise," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 275-86, March.
  16. James Dow, 2003. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(3), pages 439-454, July.
  17. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521335263 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
  19. Tighe, Carla & Michener, Ron, 1994. "The Political Economy of Insider-Trading Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 164-68, May.
  20. Liang, Woan-lih & Lin, Hsiou-wei W. & Syu, Yir-Jung, 2010. "Precision of Investor Information and Financial Disclosure," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 627-632, October.
  21. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-70, March.
  22. Steven T. Berry, 1994. "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 242-262, Summer.
  23. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
  24. Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
  25. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Insider trading with correlated signals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 105-113, October.
  26. Nevo, Aviv, 1998. "Identification of the oligopoly solution concept in a differentiated-products industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 391-395, June.
  27. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521335522 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Leonard F.S. Wang & Ya-Chin Wang, 2010. "Stackelberg real-leader in an insider trading model," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 30-46, March.
  29. Ludovic Julien, 2011. "A note on Stackelberg competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 171-187, June.
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