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Insider Trading with Different Market Structures

  • Wassim Daher

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Fida Karam

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Economics and Finance)

  • Leonard J. Mirman

    ()

    (University of Virginia - Department of Economics)

We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures : (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by each of the market structure. Finally we perform a comparative statics analysis between the models.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00639657.

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Date of creation: Aug 2011
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Publication status: Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2011.56 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2011
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639657
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639657
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  1. Tighe, Carla & Michener, Ron, 1994. "The Political Economy of Insider-Trading Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 164-68, May.
  2. Hayne E. Leland., 1990. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-195, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Rohit Rahi & James Dow, 1998. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," FMG Discussion Papers dp292, Financial Markets Group.
  4. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Insider trading with correlated signals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 105-113, October.
  5. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
  6. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2006. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 530-551, September.
  7. Creane, Anthony, 1994. "Experimentation with Heteroskedastic Noise," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 275-86, March.
  8. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2007. "Market structure and insider trading," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 306-331.
  9. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Wang, Ya-Chin & Ren, Shuang, 2009. "Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 123-131, January.
  10. Ludovic Julien, 2011. "A note on Stackelberg competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 171-187, June.
  11. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
  12. Michael Manove, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-845.
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