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Insider Trading With Product Differentiation

  • Wassim Daher

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Harun Aydilek

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences)

  • Fida Karam

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Economics and Finance)

  • Asiye Aydilek

    ()

    (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Economics and Finance)

In this paper, we analyze the effect of Cournot competition with differentiated products on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm, with three different structures in the financial market : monopoly, duopoly and Stackelberg. We shows that the degree of product differentiation does not affect the results found in the literature on insider trading, concerning the effect of the financial market structure on firms' outputs, the revelation of information and the insiders' orders. Besides, firms' output, the amount of information revealed in the stock price, the insiders' trading orders and the owners' profits are independent of the degree of product differentiation. The real market structure through the degree of product differentiation is found to determine the level of the compensation scheme earned by the manager, the market makers' response to the total order flow signal as well as the managers' profits.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00676502.

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Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00676502
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  1. Rohit Rahi & James Dow, 1998. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," FMG Discussion Papers dp292, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Wang, Ya-Chin & Ren, Shuang, 2009. "Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 123-131, January.
  3. Creane, Anthony, 1994. "Experimentation with Heteroskedastic Noise," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 275-86, March.
  4. Wassim Daher & Leonard J. Mirman, 2004. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  5. Wassim Daher & Leonard J. Mirman, 2004. "Market structure and insider trading," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04025, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  6. Tighe, Carla & Michener, Ron, 1994. "The Political Economy of Insider-Trading Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 164-68, May.
  7. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-70, March.
  8. Liu, Hong & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2011. "Insider trading with public and shared information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1756-1762, July.
  9. Karam, Fida & Daher, Wassim, 2013. "Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 44-52.
  10. Wassim Daher & Fida Karam & Leonard J. Mirman, 2011. "Insider trading with different market structures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11056, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  11. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
  12. Cheng, Louis T.W. & Davidson III, Wallace N. & Leung, T.Y., 2011. "Insider trading returns and dividend signals," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 421-429, June.
  13. Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
  14. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-87, August.
  15. Ludovic Julien, 2011. "A note on Stackelberg competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 171-187, June.
  16. Manove, Michael, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-45, November.
  17. RenÈ Caldentey & Ennio Stacchetti, 2010. "Insider Trading With a Random Deadline," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 245-283, 01.
  18. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
  19. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999. "Insider trading with correlated signals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 105-113, October.
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