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How Long Is A Piece Of Wire? Equilibrium Determination Of Local Telephone Areas

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  • Gianni De Fraja
  • Fabio M. Manenti

Abstract

This paper studies the endogenous determination of the nature of telephone calls, namely whether they are local or long distance. Calls between users in the same local calling area are local, and we allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show that the extension of the calling areas which maximises the carrier's profit is the same that a welfare maximising regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm is shown to manipulate strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop manipulates the extension of the local calling areas to increase profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Gianni De Fraja & Fabio M. Manenti, "undated". "How Long Is A Piece Of Wire? Equilibrium Determination Of Local Telephone Areas," Discussion Papers 00/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:00/03
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    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2000/0003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans Ouwersloot & Piet Rietveld, 1997. "On the Distance Dependence of the Price Elasticity of Telecommunications Demand; Meta-analysis, and Alternative Theoretical Backgrounds," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-080/3, Tinbergen Institute.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    telecommunications; local calling areas; community of interest; regulation; price cap; access; interconnection.;

    JEL classification:

    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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