Optimal Healthcare Contracts:Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Berta, Paolo & De Fraja, Gianni & Verzillo, Stefano, 2018. "Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 13357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Brenna, Elenka, 2011. "Quasi-market and cost-containment in Beveridge systems: The Lombardy model of Italy," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 209-218.
- Paul J. Eliason & Paul L. E. Grieco & Ryan C. McDevitt & James W. Roberts, 2018.
"Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(11), pages 3232-3265, November.
- Paul J. Eliason & Paul L. E. Grieco & Ryan C. McDevitt & James W. Roberts, 2016. "Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 22598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Ching-I Huang & Christopher R. Taber, 2015.
"Estimating the Cream Skimming Effect of School Choice,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(2), pages 266-324.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Ching-I Huang & Christopher R. Taber, 2010. "Estimating the Cream Skimming Effect of School Choice," NBER Working Papers 16579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bayindir, Esra Eren, 2012. "Hospital ownership type and treatment choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 359-370.
- Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Neale Mahoney, 2017. "Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 23100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywordspatients choice; cream skimming; optimal healthcare contracts; hospitals; Lombardy;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:hectdg:18/33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Rawlings). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.