Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals
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References listed on IDEAS
- Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Tore Olsen & Luigi Pistaferri, 2011.
"Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records,"
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- Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2017. "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It," NBER Working Papers 24055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steve Cicala & Ethan M.J. Lieber & Victoria Marone, 2017. "Cost of Service Regulation in U.S. Health Care: Minimum Medical Loss Ratios," NBER Working Papers 23353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2017-02-12 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HEA-2017-02-12 (Health Economics)
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