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A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio

  • Carlos Osório

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • Paulo Maçãs

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • João Leitão

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)

Resumo: Se o tempo for uma variável contínua, a comparação dos resultados decorrentes da aplicação dos modelos básicos de duopólio permite concluir que um comportamento à Cournot é mais vantajoso para as empresas do que, alternativamente, uma delas optar por assumir a liderança do mercado à Stackelberg. Tal só não acontece no primeiro momento, contudo, se as empresas optarem por uma estratégia conservadora, estas devem comportar-se à Cournot. Se uma das empresas pretender assumir a liderança, a rival reage de tal forma, que o preço pode aproximar-se do custo marginal em curto espaço de tempo. Nos momentos posteriores ao actual, independentemente do risco, a aplicação do modelo de Cournot, conduz a um equilíbrio estável dado que os lucros de Cournot são em todos esses momentos superiores aos de Stackelberg, independentemente da estratégia escolhida pelas empresas. Palavras-chave: Duopólio, Duráveis, Preço, Lucro Abstract: This paper aims at the comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg pricings for a durable good, assuming time as a continuous variable. It concludes that the Cournot's strategic conduct is better for the duopoly producers than the Stackelberg's leader. This conclusion, however, does not prevail for the first stage, although it does for the remaining. Whether one of the producers acts as a leader, the satellite rival will respond in such a way that the price approaches, in a very short time, the marginal cost. For the remaining stages, but the first one, irrespective of the risk level and the strategic conduct taken, Cournot's model implies a stable equilibrium, based on higher Cournot's profits than Stackelberg's profits. Keywords: Duopoly, Durable, Price, Profit.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0202004.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0202004
Note: Type of Document - Tex/WordPerfect/Handwritten; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 21 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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  1. Karp, Larry, 1995. "Depreciation Erodes the Coase Conjecture," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1fs6j5nn, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  2. Faruk Gul, 1987. "Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 248-254, Summer.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April.
  4. Driskill, Robert, 2001. "Durable goods oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 391-413, March.
  5. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August.
  6. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
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