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A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio


  • Carlos Osório

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • Paulo Maçãs

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • João Leitão

    (Universidade da Beira Interior)


Resumo: Se o tempo for uma variável contínua, a comparação dos resultados decorrentes da aplicação dos modelos básicos de duopólio permite concluir que um comportamento à Cournot é mais vantajoso para as empresas do que, alternativamente, uma delas optar por assumir a liderança do mercado à Stackelberg. Tal só não acontece no primeiro momento, contudo, se as empresas optarem por uma estratégia conservadora, estas devem comportar-se à Cournot. Se uma das empresas pretender assumir a liderança, a rival reage de tal forma, que o preço pode aproximar-se do custo marginal em curto espaço de tempo. Nos momentos posteriores ao actual, independentemente do risco, a aplicação do modelo de Cournot, conduz a um equilíbrio estável dado que os lucros de Cournot são em todos esses momentos superiores aos de Stackelberg, independentemente da estratégia escolhida pelas empresas. Palavras-chave: Duopólio, Duráveis, Preço, Lucro Abstract: This paper aims at the comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg pricings for a durable good, assuming time as a continuous variable. It concludes that the Cournot's strategic conduct is better for the duopoly producers than the Stackelberg's leader. This conclusion, however, does not prevail for the first stage, although it does for the remaining. Whether one of the producers acts as a leader, the satellite rival will respond in such a way that the price approaches, in a very short time, the marginal cost. For the remaining stages, but the first one, irrespective of the risk level and the strategic conduct taken, Cournot's model implies a stable equilibrium, based on higher Cournot's profits than Stackelberg's profits. Keywords: Duopoly, Durable, Price, Profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Osório & Paulo Maçãs & João Leitão, 2002. "A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio," Microeconomics 0202004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0202004
    Note: Type of Document - Tex/WordPerfect/Handwritten; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 21 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
    2. Driskill, Robert, 2001. "Durable goods oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 391-413, March.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-332, April.
    4. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-541, August.
    5. Faruk Gul, 1987. "Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 248-254, Summer.
    6. Karp, Larry, 1996. "Depreciation erodes the Coase Conjecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 473-490, February.
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    More about this item


    Duopoly; Durable; Price; Profit. Duopoly; Durable; Price; Profit.;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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