Could we build a bridge between Austrian Economics and New Institutional Economics? A Pré-History of the Soft Budget Constraint
The concept of soft budget constraint is recent in economic analysis. It has become increasingly important in economic theory, for its role as a system of incentives. However, soft budget constraint plays also an important role in the history of economic thought, where it can be traced back until Mises's writings on economic calculation and property rights, both derived from the debate of the economic calculation in socialist regimes. In this sense, soft budget constraint can be viewed as a bridge between Austrian Economics and New Institutional Economics. Since Mises, like other Austrian economists, is virtually ignored in Brazilian courses of Economic Thought, this article intends to show his importance as a forerunner of the concept of soft budget constraint, and will try to link these two theoretical views of economic systems.
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| Length: | 13 pages |
| Date of creation: | 20 Jul 2003 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Handle: | RePEc:wpa:wuwpmh:0307002 |
| Note: | Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Windows Word; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 13. comments and critics are welcome. Preliminar research in history of economic thought |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://128.118.178.162
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References listed on IDEAS
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