"Race to the Bottom" Competition by Negotiated Land Leasing: an institutional analysis and empirical evidence from Chinese cities
By analyzing the evolution of local governments' roles in different periods of China's growth in transition, this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidized land and infrastructure as a key instrument in regional competition for manufacturing investment after the mid-1990s. We relate local land development behavior to China's current land use institutions and inter-governmental arrangements. On the basis of a panel data covering prefectural-level city from 1999 to 2003, we empirically identify and compare the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing (by negotiation versus by auction/tender). Policy implications are drawn from this analysis to further reform China's urban land system and fiscal institutions.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://cema.cufe.edu.cn/|
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