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Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    (Public Economics Department, University of Rome La Sapienza)

  • Jacob Engwerda

    (Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University)

  • Joseph Plasmans

    (Faculty of Applied Economics UFSIA-RUCA, University of Antwerp)

  • Bas van Aarle

    (Faculty of Economics LICOS, Catholic University of Leuven)

Abstract

In this paper we build a three-country dynamic model of a monetary union (MU), where we focus on how coalitions among policy-makers are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. Some preliminary results based on numerical simulations are provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2005. "Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue," Macroeconomics 0504023, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504023
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bas van Aarle & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 748, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May.
    3. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March.
    4. Kohler, Marion, 2002. "Coalition formation in international monetary policy games," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 371-385, March.
    5. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
    6. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    7. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Macroeconomic stabilization; coalitions; LQ differential games.;

    JEL classification:

    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

    NEP fields

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