Price Indeterminacy Reinvented: Pegging Interest Rates While Targeting Prices, Inflation, or Nominal Income
Contrary to Sargent and Wallace (1975), a central bank’s use of an interest-rate instrument does determine prices when the central bank pursues either a short-term or long-term price target. However, in order for a central bank’s pursuit of a long-term price target to be credible, the public still needs something like a Taylor or McCallum-Woodford rule. The use of an interest-rate instrument also determines prices when the central bank targets nominal income in either the short-term or long-term. However, if the central bank targets interest rates in the short term with a long-term inflation target, then prices are indeterminate.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
- Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0501028. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.