Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations
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Other versions of this item:
- Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N. M., 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lars Frisell & Johann Lagerloef, 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/10, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Aug 2005.
References listed on IDEAS
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1995. "Cheap Talk about Specific Investments," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 313-334, October.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
- John Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-289.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1981.
"Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination,"
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More about this item
KeywordsPrice regulations; price discrimination; incomplete information; cheap talk; Robinson-Patman Act;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-10-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2005-10-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2005-10-29 (Regulation)
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