Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Lars Frisell & Johan N.M. Lagerlof, 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations," Industrial Organization 0510011, EconWPA.
- Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N. M., 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1995. "Cheap Talk about Specific Investments," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 313-334, October.
- John Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-289.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1981.
"Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
- Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination," Working papers 1095-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Katz, Michael L, 1987. "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 154-167, March.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
More about this item
KeywordsPrice regulations; price discrimination; incomplete information; cheap talk; Robinson-Patman Act;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-02-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-05 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claire Blackman). General contact details of provider: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/ .