Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form
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- Juan J. Vidal-Puga & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2004. "Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form," Working Papers 2004.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Feltkamp, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1994. "Minimum cost spanning extension problems : The proportional rule and the decentralized rule," Discussion Paper 1994-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems," Game Theory and Information 0403001, EconWPA.
- Tijs, S.H. & Moretti, S. & Brânzei, R. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited : Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects," Discussion Paper 2005-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Tijs, Stef & Branzei, Rodica & Moretti, Stefano & Norde, Henk, 2006.
"Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 121-134, November.
- Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Moretti, S. & Norde, H.W., 2004. "Obligation Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations and their Monotonicity Properties," Discussion Paper 2004-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Moretti, S. & Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "Cost Monotonic "Cost and Charge" Rules for Connection Situations," Discussion Paper 2005-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
More about this item
Keywordscost spanning tree problems canonical form rules;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-15 (All new papers)
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