Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games
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- van den Nouweland, Anne & Tijs, Stef & Maschler, Michael, 1993. "Monotonic Games Are Spanning Network Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(4), pages 419-27.
- Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler, 1998. "Spanning network games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 467-500.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Maschler, M., 1993. "Monotonic games are spanning network games," Other publications TiSEM 023e2cfe-5261-4ab3-8649-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Sharkey, W.W., 1991. "Network Models in Economics," Papers 69, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
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