Uncertainty of the Shapley Value
This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's marginal contribution during the bargaining process. The measure is symmetric with respect to exchangeable substitutions in the players, equal to zero for dummy player, and convex in the game argument. The measure is illustrated by several examples of abstract games and an example from epidemiology.
|Date of creation:||04 Sep 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; pages: 12|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994.
"Bargaining and value,"
Economics Working Papers
114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.